When technological change a¤ects the prices of tradeable assets, innovators can obtain speculative pro…ts by exploiting their inside information as to the occurrence of innovations. We propose a tractable model of endogenous growth that formalizes this argument, originally due to Hirshleifer (1971) . We then use the model to assess two claims advanced by Hirshleifer, namely, that speculative pro…ts can generate excessive investment in R&D when they add to monopoly rents guaranteed by patent protection, or else even in a perfectly competitive economy. The analysis con…rms the …rst claim, but casts doubts on the second one.
Introduction
In a classic paper, Hirshleifer (1971) noted that innovations may a¤ect the equilibrium prices of various assets that are traded in the economy. He argued that inventors are better informed than anybody else on the arrival of their own innovation, concluding that they can reap speculative pro…ts by exploiting this inside information. These speculative pro…ts may provide a reward for inventors even in the absence of any other appropriation mechanism, such as patents or secrecy.
To illustrate this possibility, Hirshleifer used the example of Ely Whitney, the inventor of the cotton gin:
[t]he cotton gin had obvious speculative implications for the price of cotton, the value of slaves and of cotton-bearing land, the site value of key points in the transport network that sprang up. There were also predictable implications for competitor industries (wool) and complementary ones (textiles, machinery). It seems very likely that some forethoughted individuals reaped speculative gains on these developments, though apparently Whitney did not. And yet, he was the …rst in the know, the possessor of an unparalleled opportunity for speculative pro…t. (p.571) Other examples of innovations a¤ecting asset prices readily come to mind: think for instance of the e¤ect of the invention of the combustion engine on the price of oil, or that of microchips on silicon. The secretive nature of insider trading makes it hard to …nd direct evidence of speculative activity carried out by innovators. However, some indirect evidence can be found, for instance, in Helfat's (1997) study on the direction of US oil …rms'R&D projects after the oil shocks. 1 In this paper, we formalize Hirshleifer's argument by developing a tractable model of endogenous growth in which the reward to inventive activity is constituted by Hish-leiferian speculative gains rather than, or in addition to, Schumpeterian monopoly rents. We then use the model to assess certain claims made by Hirshleifer, which are still echoed in the policy debate on innovation and intellectual property.
Hirshleifer recognized that inventors can capture only a fraction of the pecuniary e¤ects of innovations. The size of this fraction depends on the extent to which inside information can be exploited without being revealed. In a noiseless economy, for instance, under quite general conditions the fraction would vanish, as any inside information would be perfectly revealed as soon as its possessor tried to exploit it (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) . However, a vast literature on insider trading, starting with Kyle (1985) , has argued that in the presence of noise traders the insiders can obtain positive pro…ts by hiding behind their trades.
While this literature has shown that insider trading can be an equilibrium phenomenon, it is not the aim of this paper to incorporate a fully microfounded model of insider trading into an endogenous growth framework. Rather, we simply take the fraction of the potential speculative gains that the inventor actually captures as exogenous. This reduced-form approach sidesteps many important problems related to the functioning of …nancial markets, but allows us to address other interesting questions, which are often discussed in the intellectual property debate (see e.g. and also in the long standing legal debate on insider trading and disclosure law (see e.g. Manne, 1966 and Duggan, 1995) , 2 and yet have not been analyzed in formal economic models so far.
The …rst question is whether speculative pro…ts alone may sustain persistent innovation and growth; whether they o¤er, to use Hirshleifer's words, "an appropriate inducement to invention."Our analysis shows that they may, provided that the fraction of the pecuniary e¤ects of innovations that inventors obtain exceeds a minimum 2 The legal debate originates from Manne's (1966) provocative book against the legal ban on insider trading. The argument that insider trading constitutes an appropriate way of compensating innovators stands as a central proposition of the book: "Insider trading meets all the conditions for appropriately compensating entrepreneurs. It readily allows corporate entrepreneurs to market their innovations. . . . . [T] his is not a direct marketing of the idea, but rather a "sale"of information about an innovation" (p. 138). For an extensive review of this debate see, for instance, Bewaji (2012). threshold. This threshold can be computed analytically and depends on parameters that can be assessed empirically. After solving the model, we o¤er a tentative, preliminary assessment which may help to get a sense of the practical relevance of Hirshleifer's mechanism.
The second question that we address is the theoretical possibility that speculative pro…ts can create an excessive incentive to invest in research. There are two versions of this claim, both advanced by Hirshleifer. The …rst is that speculative pro…ts alone can be so large as to exceed the social value of innovations. This claim is based on the observation that:
there is no logically necessary tie between the size of the technological bene…t on the one hand, and the amplitude of the price shifts that create speculative opportunities on the other. The second version maintains that overinvestment in R&D can occur when the innovator obtains monopoly rents in addition to speculative pro…ts. In other words, the two versions of the claim are that speculative pro…ts may overcompensate inventors even under perfect competition, or else only in the presence of market power.
Our analysis cast doubts on the …rst claim: in our model, speculative pro…ts can never overcompensate inventors in the absence of monopoly rents. This is true even if inventors capture the pecuniary e¤ects of their innovations fully. The intuitive reason for this is that, contrary to what Hirshleifer argued, there does exist a relation between speculative opportunities and the size of innovations. To use Hirshleifer's example, if a minor shift in locomotive technology induces railroad planners to select an alternative route, then the two routes must be close substitutes both before and after the shift. If this is so, however, then changes in land value cannot be ample. Economic Inquiry
To be more precise, in our model tradeable assets appreciate only to the extent that innovations increase their productivity. This poses an upper bound on the size of the speculative gains. The upper bound is always lower than the social value of innovations, as the latter is given by the total increase in factor productivity and thus includes also the increase in the productivity of labour. However, the increase in labour productivity cannot be captured by speculators as claims on labour resources cannot be traded in legal markets due to laws against indentured servitude.
We then modify the perfectly competitive growth model to provide an assessment of the second version of the claim, i.e. that speculative pro…ts may create overinvestment in R&D in the presence of patent protection and monopoly rents. We develop a model where patent protection cannot lead to overinvestment in R&D by itself. The question then is whether inventors can be overcompensated by cumulating speculative pro…ts and monopoly rents. The answer is not obvious, as patent protection in fact crowds out speculative gains. For example, if perfectly protected patent holders could capture, by means of monopoly rents, all of the value of the innovation, then asset prices would not change at all as innovations arrive, and thus the opportunity for speculation would vanish. Therefore, overinvestment in R&D cannot occur when patent protection is perfect; nor, as we have just seen, when it is totally absent. However, we show that overinvestment may indeed arise for intermediate levels of patent protection. This validates the second, weaker version of Hirshleifer's claim.
Literature. Other papers have argued that innovation can be sustained in a perfectly competitive economy with no monopoly rents. Hellwig and Irmen (2001) and Bester and Petrakis (2003) show that persistent innovation can be driven by the inframarginal rents obtained by competitive …rms in the short run. A similar mechanism has been proposed in a series of papers by Boldrin and Levine (see e.g. Levine 2004, 2008) , who argue that innovators can pro…t by selling the …rst "copy" of their ideas. A common feature of these models is that innovative technological knowledge cannot be immediately used by …rms other than the inventor, even in the absence of patent protection. In this sense, these models depart from the traditional assumption that innovative technological knowledge is non rival (Arrow, 1962) . The mechanism proposed by Hirshleifer, in contrast, is fully consistent with that assumption. In fact, the swifter and the wider is the adoption of the new technology, the greater are changes in asset prices and hence the potential for speculative gains.
Structure of the paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the basic model. Section 3 derives the model equilibrium and provides conditions for sustained growth to be supported by speculative pro…ts alone. The two versions of the over-investment hypothesis, without and with patent protection, are analyzed in sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 summarizes the paper and o¤ers some concluding remarks.
The baseline model
In this section, we develop a stylized general equilibrium model of endogenous growth, adapted from Acemoglu (2009). In the model, innovations a¤ect the price of a productive asset, thereby creating an opportunity for speculative pro…ts.
The economy is populated by identical, in…nitely-lived households whose mass is normalized to one. There is a unique …nal good, which can be consumed or used in research. This good is taken as the numeraire. Households have additive logarithmic intertemporal preferences over consumption ‡ows c(t):
where is the rate of time preference. 3 Time is continuous and is denoted by t, but to simplify the notation we shall often suppress the time index. 3 One can easily allow for more general preferences, such as for instance
where 1= is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
The …nal good is produced in a continuum of perfectly competitive industries indexed by ! 2 [0; 1]. Since Grossman and Helpman (1991) , the assumption of a continuum of industries has become standard in the endogenous growth literature.
It guarantees that even though in each industry ! the arrival of new innovations is stochastic, by the law of large numbers there is no aggregate uncertainty. In other words, uncertainty is purely idiosyncratic and can be diversi…ed away perfectly, implying that asset pricing is not a¤ected by considerations of risk.
Each industry ! produces the same …nal good y, but using di¤erent, industryspeci…c, inputs: labour L ! and an irreproducible tradeable asset T ! . The assumption that the tradeable asset (e.g., land) is irreproducible simpli…es the analysis allowing us to abstract from issues of capital accumulation. The production function is taken to be: 4
with > 1 and 0 < < 1;
where is the income share of labour, and k(!) is total factor productivity if k(!)
innovations have occurred. That is, each innovation increases total factor productivity by a factor > 1. Summing over industries, one obtains the aggregate production function:
Each household inelastically supplies one unit of labour and one unit of the irreproducible asset in each industry. Thus, we have L ! = 1 and T ! = 1, which implies that at each point in time output equals total factor productivity:
As mentioned above, technology improves over time as a result of innovative activity. We refer to "period k(!)" as the random time interval between innovation k(!) and innovation k(!) + 1 in industry !. (For notational simplicity, we henceforth 4 The Cobb-Douglas speci…cation simpli…es the calculations but is not crucial to our results.
drop the industry index ! when this does not create any confusion.) We set k = 0 at time zero in all industries, thereby normalizing total factor productivity at time zero to 1.
In each industry ! and each period k, there is a free-entry race for innovation k + 1. The race starts as soon as innovation k is achieved and disclosed. A number of symmetric risk-neutral …rms can participate in this race by investing the …nal good in independent R&D projects. We assume that there are constant returns to R&D with no R&D spillovers. This rules out congestion e¤ects and negative or positive externalities in the research process. As is well known, these e¤ects by themselves can cause over or underinvestment in R&D. 5 Ruling them out allows us to focus on speculative pro…ts as the possible cause of overinvestment.
Each research …rm i chooses its R&D investment n i;k to obtain the k + 1-th innovation. The R&D investment is a ‡ow cost paid until the innovation is achieved.
The R&D investment produces an instantaneous probability of success of k n i;k , where k > 0 is the productivity of R&D. Since projects are independent, the arrival of innovation k + 1 follows a Poisson stochastic process with a hazard rate x k = k n k , where n k = P i n i;k denotes aggregate R&D investment. 6 To guarantee the existence of a steady state, we assume that k = k , where is a parameter that measures the productivity of R&D. 7 The rate of growth of the economy is:
and therefore is not stochastic.
We now determine the equilibrium of the economy under the assumption that markets are perfectly competitive and there is no patent protection (or secrecy). That is, all …rms active in the product market may freely use the leading technology. Innovators are rewarded by speculative pro…ts only. The question is whether these may su¢ ce to sustain steady innovation and growth.
Equilibrium prices
Factor markets are perfectly competitive. Since …rms can freely use the leading technology, the wage rate in period k is w k = k . The income share of labour is .
The remaining share represents the rents accruing to the owners of the irreproducible
The expected ‡ow return to holding the asset is the sum of the rents R k and any expected capital gain due to the arrival of innovation k + 1. Let P k denote the price of the irreproducible asset in period k. With complete information, when innovation k + 1 arrives the price would jump to P k+1 and stay constant until the next innovation. 8 However, the timing of the innovation is uncertain. The innovator, being the …rst in the know, has for a time inside information as to the arrival of the innovation. Thus, he can anticipate the market and obtain speculative pro…ts. This reduces, conversely, the capital gain that can be obtained by outside investors.
As mentioned in the introduction, here we do not model insider trading explicitly. 9 Rather, we simply assume that, by exploiting his superior information, the innovator captures a share of the change in the total value of the asset, P k+1 P k (which we also refer to as the "pecuniary e¤ects of the innovation"). We take as a parameter 8 Price increases are permanent when the asset is irreproducible. If the asset was reproducible, by contrast, any increase in its price would stimulate the accumulation of the asset until the price falls back to the asset production cost. The anticipation of this adjustment process would dampen changes in asset prices when innovations occur. 9 At the end of this section, we brie ‡y discuss some of the problems of explicitly modeling insider trading.
that ranges in between 0 and 1, 10 its size being ultimately an empirical question. We assume that the speculative process is instantaneous. 11 Uninformed investors anticipate that when the next innovation arrives they will obtain only a fraction (1 ) of the change in the value of the asset, as the remaining fraction is reaped by the inventor. This implies that their expected ‡ow capital gain is x k (1 )(P k+1 P k ). This adds to the rents R k , determining the total expected return from holding the asset.
Investors can perfectly diversify away risk by investing in di¤erent industries, so in equilibrium the expected return must equal the interest rate r. The asset pricing equilibrium condition then is:
In a steady state, the rate of arrival of innovations x k is constant across periods, and the asset price P k grows by a factor from one period to the next. Writing P k = k p; where p is the growth-adjusted asset price, the asset price equation becomes:
Equilibrium R&D investment
Consider now the equilibrium in innovation races. The prize to the winner of the k + 1-th race is the speculative pro…t k = (P k+1 P k ) : Since the instantaneous probability of success of a generic …rm i that invests n i;k units of the …nal good in that race is k n i;k , the …rm's expected ‡ow revenue is k n i;k k . On the other hand, its ‡ow R&D cost is n i;k . Because there is free entry, the zero-pro…t condition k n i;k k n i;k 0 must hold. Furthermore, in any equilibrium with positive R&D Economic Inquiry investment the condition must hold as an equality, which implies:
Using the fact that k = k and P k = k p, the zero-pro…t condition becomes: 12
Equilibrium growth
From the asset price equation (3) and the zero pro…t condition (4), one determines an increasing relationship between the interest rate and the rate of innovation:
The Euler equation provides another relationship:
These two equations can be solved simultaneously to determine the equilibrium interest rate and the rate of innovation. This immediately leads to the following result:
The equilibrium rate of innovation x is positive if and only if
When condition (7) holds, the equilibrium rate of innovation and rate of interest are:
Condition (7) follows from the fact that …rms will invest in R&D only if, when x = 0, the returns exceed the cost, which is one. When the rate of innovative activity x is zero, there is no growth and hence the interest rate coincides with the rate of Economic Inquiry time preference . An innovation would then increase the price of the irreproducible asset by an amount equal to ( 1)(1 )= , of which the inventor obtains a fraction . Therefore, the return to R&D is ( 1)(1 )= . Comparing it to the unit cost, condition (7) follows.
Condition (7) says that for persistent growth to be sustainable, it is necessary that inventors obtain at least a minimum fraction of the pecuniary e¤ects of the innovation, P k+1 P k . The minimum threshold depends on parameters ; ; and = . Those are, therefore, the parameters to be gauged in order to get a sense of how large must be for growth to be sustainable. Stokey (1995) provides also a calibration of the ratio = , suggesting for it a possible range from 0.04 to 1. 13 Note that the minimum threshold increases with = and decreases with .
Therefore, using the intervals suggested by Stokey (1995) , the lowest value of the threshold is 22% (to be precise, this value is obtained by setting = 0:64, = 1:5 and = = 0:04). This corresponds to top-left corner of the "reasonable" rectangle in Figure 1 below. As one moves away from that corner, however, the minimum threshold increases. In fact, the threshold exceeds one, meaning that speculative pro…ts alone cannot sustain growth, in a large portion of the reasonable rectangle.
For example, exceeds 1 when and = are set at the center of the rectangle. This suggests that while it is not impossible that speculative pro…ts alone can sustain persistent growth, the possibility may not seem very realistic. Economic Inquiry Going back to the analytical solution of the model, observe that when condition (7) holds …rms have an incentive to invest in R&D at x = 0 as the returns to R&D exceed the cost. In equilibrium, the rate of innovation x must then raise to the point where the returns become equal to the cost. 14 From Proposition 1 several comparative statics results immediately follow. Quite intuitively, the rate of growth increases with the inventors' ability to appropriate speculative pro…ts, . The rate of growth of the economy depends positively also on the productivity of R&D expenditure, , and the size of innovations, , whereas it depends negatively on the rate of time preferences . These latter e¤ects are natural and are the same as in standard Schumpeterian models.
A novel result is that an increase in the income share of labour reduces growth. 15 This follows from the fact that in an economy with no slavery only the fraction 1 4 An increase in x indeed reduces the return to R&D, for the following reasons. As x increases, the interest rate r must increase in order to satisfy the Euler condition. However, there is a countervailing e¤ect: an increase in x increases expected future rents, raising the current price of the asset and hence the size of the speculative pro…ts. However, the slope of the zero-pro…t condition (5) is always lower than that of the Euler condition (6) , which implies that the former, negative e¤ect must prevail over the latter. 1 5 In traditional Schumpeterian models, an increase in the income share of labour reduces the elasticity of demand for innovative goods and hence increases the monopoly price. This allows innovators to obtain higher monopoly rents and so stimulates growth (Aghion and Howitt, 1992) . Economic Inquiry (1 ) of the increase in total factor productivity is re ‡ected in changes in the prices of tradeable assets. This implies that the greater is the income share of labour , the more limited are the opportunities for speculative gains.
Insider trading
While a rigorous analysis of the inventor's speculative strategy is beyond the scope of this paper, at this point it may be useful to pause in order to brie ‡y discuss the main problems that one would have to face in developing a fully microfounded model of speculation. The …rst di¢ culty is that in a general equilibrium framework one cannot simply posit the existence of noise traders, as Kyle (1985) and many subsequent papers do, but must model their behaviour explicitly. For example, one could add a noise term to agents' endowments, creating an insurance motive for trading (as suggested by Diamond and Verrecchia, 1981) . Alternatively, one could assume that di¤erent traders have di¤erent discount rates, as in De Marzo and Du¢ e (1999). However, these or other assumptions that may rationalize the existence of noise traders would inevitably interact in non trivial ways with the delicate structure of general equilibrium endogenous growth models.
Second, the existing literature on insider trading assumes that the inside information becomes public at some exogenously pre-speci…ed date. In our framework, in contrast, the innovator may choose when to disclose the innovative knowledge to potential users. Indeed, it is only when the new technology is put in the public domain that the fundamental demand for the asset will change. Thus, the inventor must choose optimally not only the trading strategy but also the timing of disclosure.
These choice problems are further complicated by the fact that with free entry in the research sector, an inventor can never be sure to be the unique innovator, and hence the sole possessor of the inside information. Somebody else might have already innovated too, but might be concealing the innovation and secretly speculating. 16 
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With a Poisson discovery process, this possibility becomes more and more likely as time passes.
This a¤ects not only the trading strategy, but also the optimal strategy of investment in research. Not knowing whether anybody else has innovated yet, …rms may keep investing in R&D until the innovation is disclosed. However, the reward to successful completion of the R&D project obviously depends on how many other …rms have already innovated, or will innovate before the innovation is disclosed. Since this is uncertain but stochastically depends on time, the equilibrium R&D investment strategy can no longer be stationary, but must depend on the time passed since the start of the race. 17 While these problems may not be insurmountable, they certainly complicate the analysis. Therefore, our reduced-form model may be viewed as a useful means for a preliminary analysis of important policy problems. For example, Hirshleifer claimed that speculative pro…ts provide a reward for inventors that may exceed the social value of innovations, thereby leading to overinvestment in R&D. In the next two sections we shall assess this claim.
It is important to note that using the reduced-form model for this purpose may not entail any real loss of generality. For example, if overinvestment cannot occur when = 1, then it will not occur in any fully micro-founded model in which inventors can only capture a fraction of the pecuniary e¤ects of innovations. Conversely, if in our reduced-form model overinvestment can occur as soon as > 0, then it should also occur in any fully micro-founded model in which insider trading is pro…table.
The overinvestment hypothesis: perfect competition
There are in fact two versions of the overinvestment hypothesis, both advanced by Hirshleifer: that overinvestment in research may occur even under perfect competi-Economic Inquiry tion, or else that it can only in the presence of monopoly rents. In this section, we address the …rst version of the claim; the second will be analyzed in the next section.
Analytically, the question is whether the equilibrium rate of innovation x of our baseline model, given by (8), can ever be greater than the socially optimal rate of innovation. To answer this question, we must …rst turn to the analysis of the social optimum.
Since the only distortion in the perfectly competitive equilibrium is that the private incentives to innovate may not be perfectly aligned with the social ones, 18 the social optimum just requires that an optimal share of income is invested in research.
The trade-o¤ is that an increase in the share of income invested in research makes income grow more quickly, but reduces the share of income consumed. Since there is no capital accumulation, the social problem is stationary. Therefore, the optimal policy must be stationary. With a constant hazard rate x, total R&D expenditure is
We then have
Substituting into the utility function (1) one gets
The optimal innovation rate is then found by maximizing u and iŝ
provided that ( 1) > . (If this inequality is reversed, the optimal policy entails zero R&D investment, so the economy stagnates inde…nitely.) Economic Inquiry
Comparingx in equation (10) with the equilibrium rate of innovation x in equation (8), one immediately sees that x <x even when = 1. We may therefore conclude:
Proposition 2 In the baseline model, there is always underinvestment in research.
This result can be easily understood by contrasting the social and private value of innovations. The social value of innovation k is the discounted increase in total factor productivity, ( One may wonder that the baseline model might underestimate the potential for speculative gains. In particular, the model does not capture the redistributive e¤ects of technical change discussed by Hirshleifer in his "locomotive technology" example. A feature of that example is that there are various assets in the same industry and innovations are asset speci…c, meaning that the occurrence of the innovation appreciates certain assets but depreciates others. This ampli…es the opportunities for speculation.
In the Appendix we modify the baseline model so as to capture these e¤ects, allowing for changes in relative asset prices within an industry. However, we show that not even in this modi…ed model can investment in R&D be excessive when inventors are rewarded by speculative pro…ts only. Intuitively, the reason for this is that even in the modi…ed model asset prices are pinned down by market fundamentals. It seems that for overinvestment to be possible, asset prices must be somehow disconnected from fundamentals, as we shall discuss in the concluding section. In this section we analyze this latter claim. To this purpose, we modify the baseline model to allow for the possibility that imitation may be prevented by patent
protection. In such a model, inventors obtain monopoly rents. As argued by Hirshleifer, however, that does not deprive them of the possibility of speculating, too.
The issue, then, is whether inventors may be overcompensated when they cumulate monopoly rents and speculative pro…ts.
For sake of consistency, we continue to assume that innovators do not directly engage in production. Now, however, we assume that they can license their proprietary technology to competitive …rms that produce the …nal goods. The resulting revenue is similar in nature to monopoly rents. 19 A standard argument, based on the Arrow replacement e¤ect, implies that the latest innovator does not conduct any research and hence is systematically replaced by outsiders. Initially, we assume that di¤erent patents cannot be pooled together.
As a result, successive innovators must compete with each other. In particular, in each period k the latest innovator faces competition from the penultimate innovator, who stands ready to license his technology at a zero royalty rate. The latest innovator, Economic Inquiry who can license the most productive technology, will then charge a royalty of: 20
per unit of output, obtaining an aggregate pro…t of k k 1 . This pro…t ‡ow lasts until the next innovation arrives. Therefore, the discounted value of the rents accruing to innovator k is
In addition, the innovator can also obtain speculative pro…ts. With patent protection, the wage rate and the rents obtained by the irreproducible asset become by a factor 1= , too. Thus, patent protection provides monopoly rents, but crowds out speculative pro…ts -a trade-o¤ that we shall elaborate on later. 21 Inventor k will then obtain speculative pro…ts ( k k 1 ) p, where the growthadjusted asset price p is still given by the asset price equation (3). The total discounted pro…ts accruing to innovator k are therefore
In this expression, the …rst term captures monopoly rents and the second speculative pro…ts.
We now show that the possibility of cumulating these two sources of reward opens up the possibility of overinvestment in R&D. The free entry condition k k = 1 2 0 To understand this formula, notice that the net output of a perfectly competitive …rm that licenses the state-of-the-art technology is
i.e., the same as if the …rm used the technology of vintage k 1, which is less productive but does not command any royalty. 2 1 The possibility of a trade-o¤ between patents and speculative pro…ts was hinted at by Duggan (1995).
The equilibrium rate of innovation will be positive if the left-hand side of this equation, evaluated at x = 0, exceeds the right-hand side. Since at x = 0 the asset price is p =
(1 ) r and the interest rate r coincides with the rate of time preference , the equilibrium rate of innovation will be positive if
Comparing this condition with the condition for the socially optimal rate of innovation to be positive, which is
one sees immediately that as soon as > 0 the market equilibrium rate of innovation can be positive for parameter values for which the socially optimal rate is zero. This su¢ ces to prove the possibility of overinvestment. We can therefore conclude:
Proposition 3 With patent protection, as soon as inventors obtain some speculative pro…ts, the market equilibrium rate of innovation may exceed the socially optimal rate of innovation.
Since, as noted above, patent protection crowds out speculative gains, this result is less obvious than it might seem. Consider, for instance, Hirshleifer's argument that a perfectly discriminating patent holder can capture the entire social value of the innovation without speculating, and therefore must necessarily be overcompensated as soon as he can also obtain some speculative pro…ts. In fact, if patent holders could capture, by means of monopoly rents, the entire productivity improvement, then asset prices would not change at all as innovations arrive, and thus the opportunity for speculation would vanish.
To better clarify this point, note that in the model analyzed so far the only limit to patent protection is that a patent holder's market power is destroyed by the Economic Inquiry The analysis is a straightforward generalization of that developed for the case m = 1. In period k, innovator k m has just been excluded from the patent pool and so must stand ready to license his technology at a zero royalty rate. The patent pool will then charge an aggregate royalty rate per unit of output equal to
In addition, the innovator can also obtain speculative pro…ts. Now, however, each factor is rewarded as if the technology of period k m, instead of the state-of-theart technology of period k, were used. Relative to the baseline model, rents, the equilibrium price of the asset, and speculative gains are all scaled down by a factor Economic Inquiry m .
Thus, the total discounted pro…ts accruing to innovator k are
Equation (14) shows that an increase in m increases monopoly rents (the …rst term on the right-hand side) but decreases speculative gains (the second term). The intuition is that an increase in m prolongs the expected duration of the period over which innovator k collects monopoly rents, not having been displaced by m subsequent innovations yet. However, an increase in m also implies that monopoly rents are a larger fraction of output and thus less is left to reward productive assets. Therefore, an increase in m reduces asset prices, and hence also the speculative gains that inventors can obtain.
In particular, with full patent protection (m = 1), monopoly rents are maximized: each innovator k obtains a permanent ‡ow of pro…ts of k k 1 , which equals the full social value of his innovation. However, such a fully protected patent holder cannot obtain any speculative pro…ts at all. The reason for this is that with full patent protection all the productivity gains are reaped by the patent pool. As a result, asset prices do not change when new innovations arrive. That is, speculative pro…ts are crowded out fully. Therefore, the innovator obtains exactly the social value of his innovation: the equilibrium rate of innovation is just socially optimal, not higher.
When m = 0, monopoly rents (i.e., the …rst term in (14)) vanish and speculative pro…ts are largest. However, in this case we are back to the baseline model, where the equilibrium rate of innovation is always lower than the socially optimal one.
As we have seen above, however, overinvestment in research may occur for intermediate levels of patent protection, such as m = 1. The intuition is simple. When m is …nite, an inventor's pro…ts last for m periods only. However, when x is close to zero, such "periods" are in fact very long. Thus, as x approaches zero the inventor Economic Inquiry can actually capture the entire social value of his innovation by means of monopoly rents. At the same time, however, should the next innovation arrive, the asset price would jump up by a discrete amount. Anticipating this, inventors who can capture a positive fraction of the change in asset price would have an excessive incentive to invest in R&D. 24 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a model of a perfectly competitive economy in which inventors are rewarded by speculative pro…ts only, formalizing an insight originally due to Hirshleifer (1971) . We have shown that even the steady, predictable ‡ow of innovations that is postulated in models of equilibrium growth may create, for a range of parameter values, su¢ cient speculative opportunities to sustain persistent growth.
Using parameter values obtained from standard calibration exercises, the possibility seems in fact rather unlikely; but this assessment is far from de…nitive.
We have also shown that in our model inventors rewarded by speculative gains only are necessarily undercompensated. The reason for this is that the social value of innovations is the total increase in factor productivity, which includes the increase in the productivity of labour. Since labour cannot be the object of speculation, even Whatever the exact reason why asset price movements may be ampli…ed, it is clear that this should also amplify the opportunities for speculation. Re-assessing
Hirshleifer's claims in a richer framework where asset prices may be disconnected from fundamentals is an important task for future research.
Asset speci…c innovations
Assume that each industry ! comprises two sectors, indexed by v = 1; 2. In each sector, the …nal good is produced using labour and a sector-speci…c, irreproducible asset. We normalize the supply of both assets to one and denote their prices by P v;k (where k still denotes the total number of innovations in the industry). The supply of labour is …xed and equal to one in each industry. However, labour can now freely move across the two sectors of an industry.
In sector v, the production function is given by:
where L v is labour input and h v is a technological index that depends on the number of past innovations. We now specify how this technological index is determined.
In each industry, the technological frontier corresponds to a total factor productivity equal to k , where k is the total number of past innovations occurred in the industry. As in the baseline model, the variable k represents the industry-wide stock of knowledge, which all subsequent innovations build on in a cumulative way. However, each innovation is now targeted to a speci…c asset, and hence to a speci…c sector of the industry. That is, innovation k + 1 raises total factor productivity to k+1 only in the sector in which it occurs, leaving total productivity unchanged in the other sector.
With these assumptions, the two sectors never share the same technology. In the advanced sector, i.e. the sector where the latest innovation has occurred, we have Economic Inquiry h v = k. In the less advanced sector, by contrast, h v equals the latest period in which an innovation occurred there. The technological gap between the two sectors depends on whether sectors alternate in leading, or several innovations occur in a row in the same sector. This is determined endogenously in equilibrium, as we shall see below.
The assumption that innovations are sector speci…c serves to generate changes in relative asset prices. Since factor productivity increases only in the sector where the innovation has occurred, labour ‡ows from the less productive sector to the more productive one. The rents in the advanced sector increase because of the increase in productivity, and because of the in ‡ow of labour. The rents in the less advanced sector, by contrast, decrease because of the out ‡ow of labour. These creates pecuniary externalities that amplify the opportunities for speculative pro…ts as compared to the baseline model.
Like in the baseline model, we assume that the innovator can use his inside information about the arrival of the innovation to capture a share of the increase in the value of the irreproducible asset in the sector where the innovation occurred.
Let n v;k = P i n i;v;k denote aggregate R&D investment per unit of time in period k targeted to sector v. Then, the k + 1-th innovation occurs in sector v according to a Poisson process with a hazard rate x v;k = k n v;k . We continue to assume that k = k .
Equilibrium
Research …rms now choose both the level of the R&D investment and the sector they target. While we cannot rule out the possibility of multiple equilibria, we focus on the case where the opportunity for speculative pro…ts are largest. Evidently, this requires that all research is directed to the less advanced sector, so that in equilibrium the sectors systematically alternate in leading. 25 The following lemma guarantees the existence of such an equilibrium:
advanced sector: that is, x v;k = 0 whenever h v = k.
Proof. If research is directed to the more advanced sector, speculative pro…ts are a fraction of (P 2;k+1 P 1;k ) = ( p 2 p 1 ) k , where p 2 is the (growth adjusted) asset price in a sector that leads by two steps. If instead research is directed to the less advanced sector, speculative pro…ts are a fraction of (P 1;k+1
It follows that the incentive to invest is the less advanced sector is greater than in the advanced sector if
Thus, (A.2) is a su¢ cient condition for sectors to alternate in leading. To show that this condition is indeed satis…ed, we must determine p 2 . This, however, may in turn depend on the asset price when a sector is leading by three, four or more steps.
In general, in a steady state asset prices are determined by the following arbitrage conditions
:::
where the index i denotes the number of innovative steps by which sector i is leading (and, conversely, sector i is lagging). The rents R i are determined by the condition Economic Inquiry that the marginal productivity of labour must be equalized across sectors. This implies
Together with the labour market clearing condition L i + L i = 1, this condition yields:
The rents then become:
To con…rm that there is an equilibrium with x i = 0, we must consider out-ofequilibrium beliefs. Assuming rational expectations, we consider a candidate equilibrium where x 1 (= x) > 0 and x 2 > 0. (Values of x i for i > 2 are irrelevant.) In this candidate equilibrium, the arbitrage conditions become:
Since x 1 > 0 and x 2 > 0, the corresponding zero-pro…t conditions must hold as equalities. Thus, we have
which implies
Factor markets are perfectly competitive, so the wage rate equals the marginal productivity of labour:
The marginal productivity of labour is equalized across sectors at each point in time, and the allocation of labour is e¢ cient. Together with the labour market clearing .4) can be solved to yield:
Since sectors alternate in leading, when a new innovation occurs labour instantaneously ‡ows to the sector where productivity has increased.
The rents that accrue to the owners of the sector-speci…c assets are:
It can be shown that the rate of growth of the economy is still ( 1)x. 26 2 6 Substituting the equilibrium labour inputs into the production function, one gets the equilibrium outputs:
In each industry, total output
grows at rate 1 from one period to the next. Since there is a continuum of industries, however, aggregate variables grow smoothly. Summing across industries, aggregate output is
where
! is an average productivity index that increases over time with technical progress.
The rate of growth of output is the rate of growth of the average productivity index, G. To calculate
Like in the baseline model, the return to asset v is the sum of the rents earned by the asset plus any expected capital gain or loss. In equilibrium, the rate of return must equal the interest rate r, implying:
and
since only a fraction (1 ) of the capital gain (P 1;k+1 P 1;k ) accrues to outside investors; the remaining fraction is the reward to the innovator.
In a steady state, the asset price equations become:
where P s;k k p s and R s;k R s k , where p s and R s are growth-adjusted prices and rents, respectively, and s = 1; 1. These equations can be solved to express p 1 and p 1 as functions of x.
For future reference, we note that the occurrence of the innovation increases the price of the asset used in the sector where productivity increases, but decreases that of the other asset.
Lemma 2 P 1;k+1 > P 1;k and P 1;k+1 < P 1;k :
Proof. The …rst part of the lemma is obvious, so it su¢ ces to show that p 1 > p 1 :
The system (A.6) is linear in p 1 and p 1 and the matrix of coe¢ cients has full rank (assuming that the transversality condition r > ( 1)x holds, which is always true it, notice that k(!) jumps up to the next higher integer with a constant instantaneous probability x. Hence:
xG: Economic Inquiry in equilibrium). Thus, the system implicitly de…nes p 1 and p 1 as continuous and di¤erentiable functions of x and r. The explicit expressions are:
Notice that p 1 is always increasing in x, and that p 1 increases with x more rapidly than p 1 : Inequality p 1 > p 1 must then hold for all values of x if it holds when x is largest, i.e. the case = 1. In this case, we have
where the inequality holds as R 1 > R 1 . This completes the proof of the lemma.
The speculative gains accruing to the k +1-th inventor are k = (P 1;k+1 P 1;k ),
The zero-pro…t condition in innovation races then becomes
Since p 1 and p 1 are a function of x, the zero-pro…t condition determines a relationship between the interest rate and the rate of innovation. Like in the baseline model, the Euler equation provides another relationship, which together with the zero-pro…t condition uniquely determines the equilibrium interest rate and the rate of innovation.
Like in the baseline model, speculative pro…ts can sustain innovation and growth.
The necessary and su¢ cient condition is that the returns to R&D when no further Economic Inquiry innovation is anticipated exceed the unit cost of R&D. When x = 0, asset prices reduce to p 1 = R 1 = and p 1 = R 1 = . Thus, growth can be sustained by speculative pro…ts if and only if
It is immediate to verify that condition (A.8) is weaker than condition (7), con…rming that the potential for speculation is higher in the two-asset model.
Comparison with social optimum
Now we are in a position to compare once again the market equilibrium with the social optimum. Although the potential for speculation is higher than in the baseline model, we still have:
Proposition 4 In the model with asset speci…c innovations, the market equilibrium rate of innovation is always lower than the socially optimal rate.
Proof. It can be easily con…rmed that the equilibrium rate of innovation is largest when = 1. In this case, the innovator captures all the increase in the value of the asset that appreciates when the innovation arrives. Asset equilibrium prices then become p 1 = rR 1 + x R 1 r(r + x)
Notice that the price of the less productive asset is independent of x and always equals the discounted value of the rents R 1 , as all future capital gains are appropriated by the innovator. The price of the more productive asset, by contrast, decreases with
x. This follows from the fact that R 1 > R 1 . The intuitive reason is that holders of the more productive asset su¤er a capital loss when the new innovation arrives in the other sector, causing a reallocation of labour across sectors. It follows that the incentive to innovate, p 1 p 1 ; is now a decreasing function of x. Unlike the Economic Inquiry baseline model, the zero pro…t condition now determines the following relationship between the interest rate r and the rate of innovation x:
Over the relevant range, this is a decreasing function which is zero at r = ( R 1 R 1 ) and tends to in…nity as r approaches ( The equilibrium is determined by the intersection between (A.9) and the Euler equation (6) . Since the Euler equation is increasing, and r cannot exceed ( R 1 R 1 ), the equilibrium rate of innovation must satisfy:
:
This provides an upper bound on the equilibrium rate of innovation.
The socially optimal rate of innovation can be calculated proceeding as in the baseline model. Optimality requires that the static allocative e¢ ciency condition (A.4) holds. Clearly, the social planner will direct all the research to the less advanced sector, where there is more to gain from innovating. Thus, along the optimal path sectors will alternate in leading, as in the market equilibrium we have been focusing on. The optimal resolution to the dynamic trade-o¤ between current and future consumption lead to the following optimal rate of innovation: 27
: (A.11)
We now prove that x <x. From (A.10) and (A.11), it follows that a su¢ cient condition for x <x is:
Substituting for R 1 and R 1 ; ( ; ) can be written as:
Thus, the su¢ cient condition becomes:
Since H( ; 1) = 0, the su¢ cient condition becomes H 0 ( ; ) 0. We calculate: This implies that a su¢ cient condition for x <x is that K( ; ) h + (1 ) i 0. We have K( ; 1) = (1 ) 0. Thus, the su¢ cient condition can be restated as K 0 ( ; ) 0. Finally, we verify: The intuition is as follows. The reason why there is more scope for speculation in the model with asset speci…c innovations is that the reallocation of labour across sectors ampli…es changes in asset prices. Clearly, the e¤ect of labour reallocation can be strong only if the income share of labour is large. However, when is large speculative pro…ts must be small as compared to the social value of innovations.
Thus, the fact that the increase in the productivity of labour cannot be captured by speculating on the tradeable asset still produces an underinvestment result.
